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ABSTRACT
The picture is so pervasive in the financial media—the CEOs of two
major public corporations announcing the closure of a cross-border
mega-merger—that one might be led to believe that securities regulations
around the world, which govern the timing at which the information about
the merger becomes material, are identical. However, this is an optical
illusion that hides existing crucial differences in the determination of
what constitutes material information. Although securities regulations
tend to be generally harmonized, this Article sheds light on significant
differences in the rules governing the definition of what is material
information with regard to unfolding future events. Most notably, these
rules determine the timing at which information about a potential future
event becomes inside information and triggers insider trading
prohibitions.
In the U.S., the probability/magnitude test has been developed to
determine when a developing event becomes material information. In the
E.U., a bright line test applies. The different tests imply that the same
information can potentially be classified as material at different times
depending on the applicable rule. Ultimately, the European regulation is
more relaxed and consequently European insiders have the opportunity
to trade in corporate securities based on their private information,
thereby gaining an unfair advantage over uninformed market players.
This Article shows that the interjurisdictional differences create a
propensity for undesirable arbitrage and insider trading and undermine
cross-border financial investments, as well as optimal corporate
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governance in transnational corporations. The Article also explains why
a global test is much needed and why the U.S. probability/magnitude test
should be adopted because it is the superior rule in terms of increasing
investor confidence in the integrity of stock markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The news about one of the most audacious corporate frauds in history,
the “Dieselgate” emissions scandal, broke in the fall of 2015.1 To the
world’s surprise, Volkswagen, a German multinational automobile
manufacturer, had deliberately falsified emissions tests by programming
their turbocharged direct injection (TDI) diesel engines to activate their
emission controls only when the vehicles were being tested for emissions.
As a result, the nitrous oxide (NOx) output of the vehicles met U.S.
standards when the vehicles were tested, but not when they were driven
on the road, at which time the vehicles would emit up to 40 times more of
these pollutants. The emission of NOx into the atmosphere may cause
smog, respiratory disease, and even premature death.2 After the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) threatened to withhold approval
1. For a detailed description of the “Dieselgate” emissions scandal, see Roger Parloff, How VW
Paid $25 Billion for 'Dieselgate' — and Got Off Easy, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/02/06/volkswagen-vw-emissions-scandal-penalties/.
2. Researchers have found that 38,000 people a year die prematurely because of the failure of
diesel vehicles to meet lawful NOx limits in real driving conditions. See Susan C. Anenberg et al., Impacts
and mitigation of excess diesel-related NOx emissions in 11 major vehicle markets, 545 NATURE 467
(2017).
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for the 2016 Volkswagen and Audi diesel models, the German carmaker
finally admitted that it had illegally programmed the software to rig the
emissions tests.
Dieselgate swept through Europe and the U.S. like a firestorm.
Volkswagen stock plunged 45% in the days immediately after the scandal
became public.3 Shareholders have been seeking more than nine billion
dollars in damages from Volkswagen over the sharp fall in the stock price
that followed its admission of wrongdoing.4 The Higher Regional Court
of Braunschweig in Germany has been flooded with lawsuits against
Volkswagen by institutional and individual investors.5 Shareholders are
also seeking to open collective action proceedings against Volkswagen in
the Netherlands, using the “Dutch strategy,” which allows for a global
settlement of collective actions involving defendants and plaintiffs who
are foreign to the Netherlands.6 Moreover, after a sharp decline in the
price of the Volkswagen-sponsored American Depository Receipts
(ADRs)7 following the news of Dieselgate, holders of ADR certificates,
purchased on over-the-counter (OTC) platforms in the U.S., filed multiple
class action lawsuits against the company in U.S. federal courts.8
Plaintiffs’ main argument in the various actions is that Volkswagen
failed to promptly notify shareholders about U.S. authorities’ discovery
of Volkswagen’s manipulation of vehicle emissions tests. The plaintiffs
argue that the company should have informed its investors about the
possible financial damage caused by its manipulation before its ad hoc
statement in September 2015. By delaying the disclosure of the
potentially severe consequences to Volkswagen, the investors argue
that the company violated securities laws. Volkswagen argues that its
3. Ben Chu, Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal: The toxic legacy, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 17,
2016),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/Leading_business_story/volkswagen-dieselemissions-scandal-the-toxic-legacy-a7312056.html.
4. Nicola Clark, Volkswagen Shareholders Seek $9.2 Billion Over Diesel Scandal, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/business/international/volkswagen-vw-investorslawsuit-germany.html.
5. The lawsuits were filed in Germany because this is where Volkswagen stock has its primary
listing. The Regional Court of Braunschweig has jurisdiction over Wolfsburg, the German city where
Volkswagen headquarters are located.
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, Culture, and
Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1908-11 (2017).
7. An ADR is a U.S. dollar-denominated form of equity ownership in a non-U.S. company. It
represents the foreign shares of the company held on deposit by a custodian bank in the home country of
the company, and it carries the corporate and economic rights of the foreign shares, subject to the terms
specified in the ADR certificate. See Joseph Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S38, S39 (1994) (describing the different types of ADRs used by foreign issuers to
enter U.S. capital markets).
8. Judge Charles R. Breyer of the Northern District of California held that the U.S. securities laws
apply to OTC transactions in the U.S. of Level 1 ADRs sponsored by Volkswagen. See In re Volkswagen
“Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL 66281 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2017).
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management indeed missed warning signs ahead of its diesel
emissions scandal, but that did not break market rules by delaying the
disclosure of its problems. Volkswagen argues it had no obligation to
disclose the possible financial risks of its manipulation prior to September
22, 2015.9 The flip side of Volkswagen’s alleged delayed disclosure is
that it created the potential for violations of the laws restricting the
dissemination of inside information. Indeed, senior executives in
Volkswagen allegedly shared the information about the possible
financial risks associated with Dieselgate in private conversations with
outsiders at least one day before the ad hoc disclosure—a violation of
insider trading prohibitions. The German financial regulator, BaFin,
has opened a criminal investigation into this matter.10 Although this
investigation is yet to be concluded, even if Volkswagen had
legitimately delayed the disclosure of the information about Dieselgate
to the public,11 the information would have still been considered
precise and material enough to be deemed inside information, which
is subject to strict prohibitions regarding its dissemination.
Therefore, the main issue the international courts and regulators will
have to address is the same legal question underlying this Article: at
what point in time does information about an unfolding event, that is
far from resolution, become material?
The answer to this question has a dual role in securities regulation.
First, investors have great interest in information about events that are
likely to happen in the future because it directly effects their investments.
By the same token, this information is extremely valuable to corporate
insiders. According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which is
the prevalent hypothesis underlying securities regulation, stock prices
fully reflect all available information.12 The EMH claims that stock prices
instantly change to reflect new public information.13 Therefore, unless an
investor trades on the basis of inside information, it is impossible to “beat
the market” on a risk-adjusted basis and consistently produce excess
9. Andreas Cremer, VW tells court it did not break rules over 'dieselgate' disclosure, REUTERS
(M ar. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions/vw-tells-court-it-did-notbreak-rules-over-dieselgate-disclosure-idUSKCN1GD60O.
10. BaFin confirmed in 2017 that it was investigating its suspicion that a top executive at
Volkswagen shared information about the magnitude of the scandal with a small circle of select outsiders
before duly disclosing the information to the public. Andreas Cremer & Jan Schwartz, German Regulator
Launches Another Probe into VW Over Scandal, REUTERS, (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-probe/german-regulator-launches-anotherprobe-into-vw-over-scandal-idUSKBN1DA2GZ.
11. For the conditions under the European law allowing issuers to delay disclosure of material
information, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
12. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383 (1970).
13. Id. at 404-409.
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returns because market prices constantly reflect the “fair value” of the
corporation and should react only to new public information. But because
the market does not react to unknown events, an investor’s superior ability
to predict how uncertain processes are likely to unfold presents an
opportunity to extract an above-average return in the stock market. Even
better, an investor’s knowledge of an undisclosed event presents a golden
opportunity for a huge profit where the markets are not yet aware of the
disclosure. As was arguably the case in Dieselgate, corporate insiders that
are privy to private information and outsiders that come into possession
of inside information may use this information to trade in corporate
securities, thereby gaining an unfair advantage over uninformed market
participants.14
Both U.S. and European jurisdictions have legal regimes that prohibit
insider trading, on the one hand, and govern the disclosure of information
about unfolding events that have not yet fully materialized, on the other
hand. As disussed in this article, these regimes differ from each other.
Although the differences in defining what constitutes material
information may not seem dramatic at first glance, the divergence is
significant, particularly with regard to insider trading. The difference has
several detrimental implications. First, it undermines the global effort to
harmonize capital markets and securities regulation. Second, it has the
potential to undermine U.S. investors’ trust in cross-border investments.
Third, it creates hidden incentives for managerial opportunism.
While corporate law and corporate governance are characterized by
interjurisdictional competition,15 securities regulation tends to be more
harmonized across countries.16 However, there are some aspects of
14. Goshen and Parchomovsky explain that the mechanism that drives financial markets is
informational trade by corporate outsiders. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L. J. 711 (2006). When corporate insiders trade on the basis of
nonpublic information, outsiders are driven out of the market. See Lars Klöhn, Inside information without
an incentive to trade? What’s at stake in ‘Lafonta v. AMF’, 10 CAPITAL MKTS. L. J. 162 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial
Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340 (2006); Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi,
Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law (Yale L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 528,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685969.
16. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the
Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 227 (1998) (“[T]he dominant trend in securities
regulation is harmonization and convergence of domestic national regimes…”). The effort to harmonize
disclosure rules and reporting standards has been particularly evident in securities regulation and financial
accounting. See generally Karel Van Hulle, International Convergence of Accounting Standards: A
Comment on Jeffrey, 12 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L. L. 357 (2002); Roberta S. Karmel, The E.U. Challenge to
the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692 (2008) (discussing the efforts to bring U.S. and international
accounting standards into convergence). See also Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities
Regulation: The United States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 187, 192 (2010) (arguing that “[T]he United States government should push for the
harmonization and centralization of international securities regulation to end the race-to-the-bottom in
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securities regulation that do exhibit a certain level of regulatory
competition or regulatory divergence. For example, jurisdictions may
differ regarding the thresholds at which disclosure obligations are
triggered,17 the period of time corporations have until periodic reports
have to be filed,18 or the complexity and extent of details that must be
disclosed in the reports.19
Nevertheless, the core concepts of securities regulation tend to be
similar across jurisdictions. For example, both U.S. and European
jurisdictions conform to the maxim that information regarding “material”
events is important to investors and that when material information
remains nonpublic, insider trading prohibitions apply. Hence,
“materiality” is a common principle of securities regulation. Materiality
is important to both disclosure obligations and insider trading
prohibitions. If information is material, it is often subject to disclosure
obligations. When material information is not disclosed, insiders holding
this information while trading in the stock market have an unfair

international securities law and to avoid another financial crisis”); Marco Ventoruzzo, Comparing Insider
Trading in the United States and in the European Union: History and Recent Developments 3 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 257/2014, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442049 (arguing
that “notwithstanding the different theoretical underpinnings of insider trading in the U.S. and in Europe,
the practical scope of the two systems are largely similar, especially in the most egregious cases, even if
important differences exist.”).
17. See, e.g., Michael C. Schouten & Mathias M. Siems, The Evolution of Ownership Disclosure
Rules Across Countries, 10 J. CORP. L. STUD. 451 (2010).
18. For instance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires public
corporations to file annual reports (known as Forms 10-K) within 60 to 90 days from the end of the fiscal
year, depending on, inter alia, the value of floated shares. See Fast Answers Form 10-K,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-form10khtm.html. The deadline in the UK, after
implementation of the European Directive, is more relaxed. A UK public company listed on the London
Stock Exchange must disclose its annual report, including the audited annual financial statement, within
four months of the end of the fiscal year. See Rule 4.1.3 of the Disclosure and Transparency Rules of the
UK
Financial
Conduct
Authority
(FCA),
FCA
Handbook,
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR/4/1.html.
19. A recent example is the requirement to disclose the so-called “Pay Ratio.” Section 953(b) of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 directed the SEC to amend
Item 402 of Regulation S-K to require issuers to disclose the ratio between the annual compensation of
the CEO and the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of an issuer, except the CEO.
The SEC implemented the complex disclosure rule in 2015, in its Pay Ratio Disclosure, Release No. 339877, Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50104, 50105 (Aug. 5, 2015). The SEC requires that all
employees, including those employed outside the U.S., be included in the calculation of the workforce for
the purpose of locating the median employee, unless foreign employees represent 5% or less of employees.
By comparison, there is no mandatory pay ratio disclosure in Europe. The first European country to
consider adopting pay ratio disclosure is the UK. In mid-2018, the UK government decided to consider
requiring large listed UK public corporations to disclose pay ratios, as part of a corporate governance
enhancement reform. A draft legislation on the subject was published for public discussion. See The
Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 No. 860 (11 June 2018). The UK proposal is
richer than that of the SEC in that it suggests disclosing the ratio of the CEO’s pay to the median (50th),
25th, and 75th percentile fulltime equivalent remuneration of employees. The U.K. draft proposal,
however, limits the ratio to UK employees only.
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advantage over other investors. If, however, information is not material,
it can actually harm the investors to require disclosure.20
Determining whether information is material or not is one of the most
common tasks of corporate officers and securities lawyers.21 The
determination can be based on precise numerical thresholds, such as: the
effect of a certain transaction on the annual revenue of the corporation,
the value of its asset portfolio, its obligations, etc. Some information,
however, is “softer” but still material. This type of information may
include regulatory changes that may influence the future value of the
corporation, sea changes in market competitiveness, an illness of the
founder of the corporation,22 unplanned stepping down of the CEO,
potential exposure to lawsuits due to wrongdoing.
Many material events in the daily life of a corporation are sudden or
unexpected. Securities regulation regimes often require corporations to
make current disclosures about such events. Otherwise, insiders are
required to abstain from trading in the corporation’s securities while the
information is nonpublic. This is often described as the disclose-orabstain-rule.23 Determining materiality becomes complicated when the
underlying events have not yet occurred but are in the process of
materializing.24 Even if material information about a future event is not
made public, determining its materiality is important. When corporate
20. Disclosure of immaterial information is potentially problematic because it may help
corporations conceal important negative information by overloading investors with immaterial
information. Investors may be overwhelmed by “noise,” the multitude of disclosures of immaterial events,
and overlook or underestimate the relatively few material events being disclosed. Therefore, too much
disclosure might be bad in and of itself. For a general critique of the overuse and overreliance on mandated
disclosure, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647 (2011).
21. Soderquist and Gabaldon explain that “[t]he process of determining materiality takes the most
skill and judgment.” See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 75 (5th ed.
2014). Choi and Pritchard add that “determining whether a particular morsel of information is material is
often an uncertain process.” See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND ANALYSIS 48 (4th ed. 2015). For a comparative analysis of materiality tests in the U.S. and the E.U.,
arguing that Bayesian inference is common to both regimes in determining whether a particular additional
undisclosed fact is important to investors, see Kurt S. Schulzke & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Toward a
Unified Theory of Materiality in Securities Law, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 6, 32 (2017).
22. This is a particularly sensitive example because of the privacy aspects involved in such
disclosures. Additionally, the point in time at which an executive’s medical condition requires disclosure
is not only the executive’s decision but likely that of the board. See Tom C. W. Lin, Undressing The CEO:
Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 413 (2009)
(“[O]nce the board determines that such information is material and should be made available to the
public, it should be timely disclosed within the existing disclosure framework.”). For an example, see the
disclosure by Google (now Alphabet) co-founder Sergey Brin about his potential Parkinson’s disease risk.
Miguel Helft, Google Co-founder Has Genetic Code Linked to Parkinson’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2008),
http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/technology/19google.html.
23. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
24. This Article focuses on current disclosures, but the issue discussed here also applies to periodic
disclosures that need to be made when events are still in the process of materializing.
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insiders possess material nonpublic information, they have an unfair
advantage over other market players, and therefore are prohibited from
trading in corporate securities in such circumstances.25
The U.S. and Europe have different methods of determining the
materiality of information regarding future events. The two regimes differ
on the essential determination of materiality. In other words, even if the
more technical nuts and bolts of securities regulation are harmonized
about how to handle material information, the two regimes may still be
expected to yield different outcomes because what is deemed material
information will be different in the jurisdictions. The interjurisdictional
difference in determining materiality is far from merely a theoretical
exercise. It has implications for transnational corporations that may seize
regulatory arbitrage opportunities to avoid burdensome disclosure
regimes and the associated liability. The difference has implications also
in cases of cross-border mergers and acquisitions of listed corporations.
Because of these significant implications, it is important to discuss the
potential for arbitrage that the disparity in the threshold of materiality
creates—especially in the enforcement of insider trading prohibitions.
The interjurisdictional difference undermines cross-border financial
investments as well as optimal corporate governance in transnational
corporations. Therefore, after analyzing the different approaches of the
U.S. and E.U. to uncertain events, and the significant implications of the
difference, this Article proposes the adoption of a global test for
determining the materiality of future events. The proposal is based on the
advantages of harmonization in securities regulation across the globe and
on the superiority of the U.S. probability/magnitude test which aims at
increasing investor confidence in the integrity of stock markets and
corporations.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the divergent legal
development of the U.S. and E.U. tests for determining the materiality of
information regarding future events, followed by a comparison of the
tests. Part III discusses the significant implications of the different
materiality tests. Part IV proposes a global rule for determining the
materiality of future events, discusses the benefits of harmonization in
securities regulation, and argues for the superiority of the U.S. over the
E.U. test. Part V then concludes the discussion.

25. The U.S. SEC strictly applies this prohibition. However, because stock- or option-based
remuneration is pervasive in public corporations, a so-called “Rule 10b5-1 safe harbor plan” has emerged.
These are passive investment schemes in which insiders holding shares or options relinquish direct control
over their transactions when they possess material non-public information. These plans provide an
affirmative defense against insider trading on the condition, inter alia, that they are entered into and
implemented in good faith. In short, the insider is relinquishing control over his or her shares to a third
party and therefore has an affirmative defense to insider trading allegations.
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II. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO UNCERTAIN EVENTS
This Part outlines the development of the two major tests for
determining a company’s disclosure obligations for unfolding events. The
threshold question is whether the unfolding event is material. Different
jurisdictions attack this question in different ways. This Part starts with
the U.S. test, not only because it is by far the most developed, but also
because it emerged from a detailed deliberation of various possible tests.
This test is called the probability/magnitude test. The European test, in
contrast, reflects the outcome of a political strong-arming process
between E.U. member states. The difference in the process through which
these regimes emerged does not mean that the U.S. approach is
necessarily more rigorous than the E.U. approach. In fact, the European
approach is probably more demanding in many respects. This Part strives
to emphasize the difference between the materiality tests and why the
difference is so critical.
A. The U.S. Probability/Magnitude Test
In 1968, the Second Circuit introduced the probability/magnitude test
for the first time in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur (hereinafter “TGS”).26 In
TGS, Employees of TGS were privy to information about preliminary
findings of minerals in the company’s mining explorations in Canada.
The findings were indicative of a potentially large mineral deposit. The
information was not made public, and employees started buying and later
trading TGS stock based on the hope that these findings would create large
profits for the company. The court had to determine whether the
information in the possession of the defendants should be deemed
material, despite the uncertainty in the initial stages of the mining
exploration.
The
court
developed
and
formulated
the
probability/magnitude test: “[w]hether facts are material . . . will depend
at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
the totality of the company activity.”27
A few years later, the Third Circuit adopted another test regarding the
disclosure of negotiations in anticipation of a transaction.28 Under this
test, established in Greenfield v. Heublein, information about an
anticipated transaction becomes material only when an agreement-inprinciple is reached, generally in the form of an initial agreement on the

26. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 849.
28. Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1984).
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structure of the deal and the price.29 The agreement-in-principle test is a
bright-line rule. Although this test applies to disclosure of negotiations
leading to a transaction such as a merger or an acquisition, it is equally
applicable to any material transaction of the corporation. A bright-line
rule is simpler for a court to apply compared to the probability/magnitude
text because it focuses on a particular set of facts or circumstances that
can be factually verified, such as an agreement on particular elements of
a contract.
However, in 1988, the Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit’s
bright-line rule in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.30 Basic concerned a class action
brought by investors who sold their shares before an announced merger
of the corporation. The investors argued that they had been misled by the
corporation, which in response to questions from different entities,
including the New York Stock Exchange, denied at least three times that
merger negotiations were in progress. The denial turned out to be false.31
Twenty years after the Second Circuit first used the
probability/magnitude test in TGS, the Supreme Court directed courts to
use the probability/magnitude test in determining the materiality of
information about business transactions.32 Basic is a particularly
important ruling in this respect because of the in-depth discussion by the
Supreme Court of the two competing tests and the explicit preference
stated for the probability/magnitude test.
According to U.S. securities regulation, as opposed to the rule in the
E.U., there is no obligation mandating public corporations to disclose
merger negotiations.33 But if a corporation is asked to respond to a
29. Id.
30. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
31. Id. at 233 n.4.
32. Id. at 234–236. The Delaware court also adopted the probability/magnitude test in Alessi v.
Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 944–950 (Del. Ch. 2004), overturning an earlier ruling in Bershad v. CurtissWright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987) that favored the bright-line rule.
33. The disclosure of events that are not governed by mandatory disclosure obligations in the U.S.
is governed by SEC Rule 10b-5, C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
563 U.S. 27, 44 (2011) (holding that Rule 10b–5(b) does “not create an affirmative duty to disclose any
and all material information.”). A listed company on a stock exchange has some obligations to make
prompt public disclosure of material information. It appears, however, that a breach of this obligation with
regard to information that has not been made public earlier and is not subject to a specific disclosure
obligation cannot be the basis of a cause of action by the SEC or by an investor seeking damages. See
Allan Horwich, The Legality of Opportunistically Timing Public Company Disclosures in the Context of
Rule 10b5-1, 71 BUS. L. 1113, 1128-29 (2016). A mandatory disclosure regarding future events applies,
for example, in the case of first-time issuers. These issuers are obligated to disclose future business
acquisitions according to SEC S-X Rule 3-05, which requires issuers to include in their financial
statements “probable” acquisitions, if they are material. In this case, materiality is measured by any one
of three magnitude tests: the issuer’s investment, the issuer’s total asset change, or the issuer’s change in
pre-tax income. The SEC’s guideline indicates that probability should be assessed by a consideration of
all available facts. See SEC Financial Reporting Manual s. 2005.4. Once information about a future event
has been made public, there is an obligation to update it with fact-based forward-looking information.
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question regarding such negotiations or other unfolding material events,
it can confirm or deny the information or it can respond with “no
comment.”34 In any case, the corporation must respond truthfully.35
In Basic, the Court addressed whether information regarding
negotiations pertaining to an uncertain merger constitutes material
information. If the answer is yes, denying the existence of negotiations
means that the investors were given incorrect information about material
facts, providing a basis for a class action. If, however, the answer is no
and the information is immaterial, no harm has occurred and therefore a
class action cannot be sustained.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, discussed and rejected three
main arguments that supported the agreement-in-principle test to
determine the materiality of information concerning uncertain future
events.36 The first argument rejected stated that investors will be
overwhelmed and misled by uncertain information. This argument
focuses on the welfare of investors. The court rejected it as paternalistic
and contravening the broad policy generally favoring disclosure in
securities regulation. In Justice Blackmun’s view, the materiality criterion
aims not to protect investors from uncertain information but rather to
screen out immaterial information. When uncertain information is
material to investors, the concern that it may not be evaluated accurately
by unsophisticated investors does not justify its suppression.37
The second rejected argument, which concerns the welfare of the
corporation, was that negotiated deals may fail if the corporation is
required to disclose the negotiations at an early stage.38 The agreementin-principle test often indicates that the threshold of materiality is the
point where a general outline of the deal and a price are reached. In other
words, information about a transaction becomes material when the
probability of consummating the deal is relatively high, but before the
See, e.g., In re International Business Machines Corporate Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2010).
The fact that the U.S. lacks a general duty to disclose material nonpublic information is occasionally cited
as a major difference between the U.S. and the E.U. in terms of securities regulation. However, this
information gap has been minimized in recent years. For example, the list of events that require immediate
disclosure according to Form 8-K was expanded. See generally THOMAS. L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 318 (6th ed. 2009). Also, as Ventoruzzo points out, stock exchanges do impose
broader prompt disclosure obligations, e.g., N.Y.S.E. Company Manual, Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,121
(1977); American Stock Exchange Company Guide (CCH) ¶ 10,121; Sec.Exch.Act Rel. No. 34-8995
(Oct. 15, 1970). However, these obligations are not strictly enforced. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 16, at
14.
34. Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17 (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule
10b–5.”).
35. According to the language of Rule 10b-5(b), it is unlawful to make false or untrue statements,
a rule that is enforceable by the SEC or through civil actions.
36. Basic, 485 U.S. at 233.
37. Id. at 234.
38. Id.
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deal is consummated. The Basic Court distinguished, however, between
the definition of materiality and the existence of a duty to disclose
material information and noted that the issue before it was only a matter
of defining the materiality test.39
Indeed, disclosure obligations associated with the sale of shares on the
stock market, as was the case in Basic, have downsides that merit a
broader discussion. For example, such early disclosures may prematurely
expose company information to competitors. To minimize this risk,
regulators in Europe give companies the discretion to delay disclosure of
negotiations until the deal is closed,40 and U.S. stock exchanges often
require disclosure only in response to questions, thereby allowing the
parties to keep the negotiations secret.41 The Basic Court obviously
preferred to sidestep this discussion.
The third rejected argument, which also concerns the welfare of the
corporation, was that the agreement-in-principle test reduces corporate
costs because it is a bright-line rule.42 Under this argument, the brightline rule reduces uncertainty about compliance with disclosure
obligations, and it is a simple test that courts can apply. The Court,
however, rejected the simplicity argument, implying that it favored a test
that resulted in accuracy rather than symplicity. The Court held that
determining materiality of information on the basis of fewer facts is likely
to be less accurate than determination based on a more complex set of
data, as required by the probability/magnitude test.43
The court concluded by adopting the probability/magnitude test as the
correct test to be applied in determining the materiality of future uncertain
events.44
B. The E.U. Bright-Line Test
The current securities regulation regime in the E.U. is the result of a
long deliberative process, driven by a desire to increase investor
protection and investors’ faith in the integrity of markets.45 Within this
context, the E.U. puts an emphasis on a broad disclosure obligation and a
39. Id. at 235.
40. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text for the approach adopted by the U.S. SEC.
42. Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.
43. Id. (“Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality must necessarily be over-inclusive or underinclusive.”).
44. Id. at 249.
45. Sebastian Mock, History, Application, Interpretation, and Legal Sources of the Market Abuse
Regulation, MARKET ABUSE REGULATION COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE 3, 3-11 (Marco
Ventoruzzo & Sebastian Mock eds., 2017).
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particular obligation to make ad hoc disclosures regarding ongoing
events. This continuous disclosure obligation is described as a
“cornerstone” of the current European securities regulation regime.46 At
the same time, the E.U. puts a strong emphasis on the need to regulate
insider trading by introducing a very complex set of rules that discusses
how to handle inside information.47
The regulation of both insider trading prohibitions and issuer disclosure
duties in the E.U. is governed by the recently adopted Market Abuse
Regulation (MAR).48 The MAR has replaced the Market Abuse Directive
(MAD)49 and has direct application in the E.U. member states.
One of the major innovations within the MAR is the unification of the
definitions of materiality with regard to insider trading restrictions and
issuer disclosure duties. In fact, the objective of the MAR is dual: to
increase uniformity and at the same time to increase the information
available to investors.50 The latter clearly results in the imposition of
significant compliance costs.51
The notion of “inside information” is a key element of the MAR.
Article 7(1)(a) of the MAR follows the definition of “inside information”
provided in the MAD and holds that inside information is:
information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating,
directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more financial
46. Alain Pietrancosta, Public Disclosure of Inside Information and Market Abuse, in MARKET
ABUSE REGULATION COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE, supra note 45, at 47, 51-52 (stating that ad
hoc disclosures serve the greater purpose of market efficiency and not simply the prevention of insider
trading).
47. The non-exhaustive list contains: Article 7 of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) that defines
inside information; Article 8 MAR that defines the prohibition on insider trading (or “dealing” in the
preferred terminology of the MAR); Article 9 MAR which lists exceptions to the prohibition in which it
is legitimate to trade; and Article 10 MAR which clarifies that disclosure of material information to third
parties in itself constitutes a violation of the MAR's insider trading prohibition designed to prevent insiders
from transferring material information to a large and unknown circle of outsiders. Violation of the latter
prohibition is the main suspicion being investigated with regard to the Dieselgate scandal. See supra note
10 and accompanying text; Article 18 MAR requires corporations to keep lists of insiders in order to keep
track of those who possess inside information. See also generally Ventoruzzo, supra note 16.
48. The Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 (hereinafter “MAR”) and the Directive on
Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse 2014/57/EU (“MAD II”) became effective 3 July, 2016. The MAR
is directly applicable in all E.U. member states; MAD II requires transposition into national law. The
MAR and MAD II replace the previous Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC (“MAD I”). As far as
disclosure of unfolding events is concerned, the common view is that the MAR codified preexisting law.
This view is mirrored in a blog discussion on the effect of the MAR two years after it came into force,
noting that “the basic rules for defining inside information have remained the same.” See Anna Rossler,
2 Years of Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) – What Has Changed?, EQS GROUP INVESTOR RELATIONS
(July 3, 2018), https://blog.eqs.com/2-years-of-market-abuse-regulation.
49. Directive 2003/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 6 (EU), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2003.096.01.0016.01.ENG.
50. See Pietrancosta, supra note 46, at 51-52.
51. Id.
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instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price
of related derivative financial instruments.52

This definition contains several elements that must be satisfied to
cateorize a piece of information as inside information. First, the
information must be of a “precise nature.” Second, the information must
not be public. Third, the information has to relate to the corporation or the
financial instruments that relate to the corporation. Fourth, the
information must be likely to have an effect on the price of the relevant
financial instrument. Fifth, the likely effect on the price has to be
“significant.”
The MAR sought to clarify some of the legal uncertainties of the MAD,
including the lack of clarity with respect to the meaning of “precise
nature” within the aforementioned first element.53 Article 7(2) of the
MAR explains that information will be deemed to be of a “precise nature”
if:
. . . it indicates a set of circumstances which exists or which may reasonably
be expected to come into existence, or an event which has occurred or
which may reasonably be expected to occur, where it is specific enough to
enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of
circumstances or event on the prices of the financial instruments… In this
respect in the case of a protracted process that is intended to bring about,
or that results in, particular circumstances or a particular event, those future
circumstances or that future event, and also the intermediate steps of that
process which are connected with bringing about or resulting in those
future circumstances or that future event, may be deemed to be precise
information.54

Through this rather complicated definition, the MAR aims to recognize
that unfolding events can be material and that even intermediate steps
leading up to future events may be deemed sufficiently precise in certain
situations.
For a clarification of what is “precise,” the European Court of Justice’s
(ECJ) decision in Geltl v. Daimler is helpful.55 Geltl concerned a current
52. MAR, Article 7(1)(a).
53. The MAR also seeks to clarify the meaning of “significant effect” on the price of a financial
instrument. Article 7(4) of the MAR explains that information having a significant effect is “information
[that] a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his or her investment decisions.”
54. Article 7(3) of the MAR clarifies that “[A]n intermediate step in a protracted process shall be
deemed to be inside information if, by itself, it satisfies the criteria of inside information as referred to in
this Article.”
55. Case C-19/11, Markus Geltl v. Daimler AG, ECLI:EU:C:2012:397 (2012). For a discussion of
the case, see also Hartmut Krause & Michael Brellochs, Insider Trading and the Disclosure of Inside
Information after Geltl—A Comparative Analysis of the ECJ Decision in the Geltl vs Daimler Case with
a View to the European Market Abuse Regulation, 8 CAPITAL MARKETS L. J. 283 (2013). See also
Christian Kersting, Insider Dealing and Ad Hoc Disclosure Requirements in the New EU Market Abuse
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disclosure regarding the retirement of Detlef Schrempp, chairman of the
Daimler management board. Schrempp had discussed his thoughts about
stepping down with numerous members of the supervisory board and the
management of Daimler.56 Although the boards were informed, an
announcement to the authorities was made only after the supervisory
board decided on Schrempp’s resignation. The announcement was
followed by a sharp rise in the share price of Daimler. The plaintiff, Geltl,
had sold his shares prior to the announcement. In a lawsuit filed in the
German court, Geltl sued for compensation, arguing that the disclosure
was made too late. The German court referred the matter to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling on the question of whether intermediate steps leading
to a final event, in this case the resignation of the chairman, should be
regarded as “precise information.” The ECJ answered in the affirmative,
an answer that is now codified in the latter part of Article 7(2) of the
MAR.
In Geltl, the ECJ also addressed the probability threshold beyond which
uncertain future events should be considered inside information. The ECJ
held that a future event should be expected to occur if there is a realistic
prospect that it will come to pass.57 According to the Court and
commentators, this wording in Article 7(2) of the MAR of the expression
“reasonably… expected to occur,” should not be perceived as requiring a
high probability.58
Article 17(1) of the MAR requires issuers to disclose to the public “as
soon as possible” any information that falls within the ambit of “inside
information.” The MAR prohibits trading by insiders when in possession
of inside information,59 but allows issuers to delay a disclosure at their
own discretion and responsibility.60 Delays are permitted where an
immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice a legitimate interest of the
issuer, the delay is not likely to mislead the public, and the issuer can

Regulation, 33:1 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POLICY REPORT 15, 16-17 (2014) and the citations in
footnote 28.
56. Like many large German companies, Daimler has a dual board structure; it includes a
management board that runs the company, and a supervisory board that deals with monitoring and longterm agenda-setting.
57. Geltl, ECLI:EU:C:2012:397 ¶ 56.
58. See Kersting, supra note 55, at 17. In the case of Lafonta, the ECJ uses the terms “likely” and
“unlikely” to determine whether a set of facts regarding a future event will be considered inside
information. This strengthens our supposition that the European court draws the materiality threshold at
50% or higher. Case C-628/13 Lafonta v. Autorite des marches Financieres (11 March 2015). See also
Jesper Lau Hansen, Say When: When Must an Issuer Disclose Inside Information? 18-19 (Nordic &
European Company Law Working Paper No. 16-03, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795993.
59. MAR, Art. 14. This Article also precludes attempted insider trading and the unlawful
disclosure of inside information.
60. MAR, Article 17(4). In Art. 17(5) MAR adds specialized conditions regarding delayed
disclosure of material inside information by credit institutions and banks.
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ensure the confidentiality of the information before it is disclosed.61 The
MAR requires issuers that have decided to delay a disclosure to notify the
“competent authorities” of the delay after the disclosure is finally made
and to explain how they met the conditions associated with the delay.
Considering the burden this regime imposes on both issuers and
regulators, however, the MAR stipulates that regulators are allowed to opt
out or waive the compulsory post-delayed-disclosure report, and merely
reserves the right to demand an explanation from the issuer upon
request.62
To understand the complexity and importance of the Geltl case to the
legal question highlighted in this Article, a brief historical detour is
needed. The former MAD allowed member states to use different
definitions for so-called “private information” that was subject to
nationally prescribed disclosure obligations and for “material
information” used for the purpose of applying insider trading
restrictions.63 Some states, like Germany, used an identical test for the
terms, whereas other states such as Italy, U.K. and the Nordic states used
different tests to identify the information.64 Italy is particularly
interesting, as it restricted the definition of material inside information to
events that already occurred and left out information about events that are
still ongoing and expected to materialize in the future.65 The final result
in the MAR is often referred to as the “one-step model,” which was
historically driven by Germany and unifies material information, to which
a duty to disclose applies, with the imposition of insider trading
prohibitions.66 The one-step model creates a “short blanket” problem:67 If
the disclosure obligation is triggered too soon, it might stifle protractedprocess events that need confidentiality in order to materialize, but if the
obligation is imposed too late, insiders may use private information to
their own advantage in the meanwhile. Instead of a two-step model, the
MAR includes the possibility of postponing the disclosure of developing
61. See generally European Securities and Markets Authority, Final Report: Guidelines on the
Market Abuse Regulation - Market Soundings and Delay of Disclosure of Inside Information (13 July
2016); Stefano Lombardo & Federico M. Mucciarelli, Market soundings: the interaction between
securities regulation and company law in the United Kingdom and Italy (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 362/2017, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3012183. Articles 17(7) and 17(8)
of MAR impose the obligation to disclose information as soon as possible if confidentiality has been
breached, or even if a sufficiently accurate rumor undermines the secrecy of the information.
62. MAR, Article 17(4).
63. This is by virtue of the fact that a directive of the European Parliament, like the MAD, needs
to be implemented by each member state in its internal law as opposed to European regulation like the
MAR, which enjoys direct application in all member states. See Mock, supra note 45.
64. See Pietrancosta, supra note 46, at 54-55.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Hansen, supra note 58, at 7.
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events,68 and a corresponding complex regime of maintaining internal
confidentiality.69
The Geltl case, which preceded the MAR, has been criticized for
confusing and “contaminating” the interpretation of materiality in insider
trading because it was a disclosure case but the court considered both
insider trading and disclosure arguments to interpret the definition of
materiality.70 The MAR provides clarity in that it combines the two
concepts of materiality into a single definition.
Note, however, that neither the MAR nor the ECJ decision in Geltl
proposes to combine or consider the relationship between the probability
of a future event occurring and its magnitude. Hence, the balancing of
probability and magnitude that characterizes materiality decisions under
the U.S. regime is absent in the E.U.
C. Comparison of the Tests
As discussed, the two tests that exist for determining the point in time
at which information regarding an unfolding process that is likely to
materialize into a particular event in the future is considered material
information are the U.S. probability/magnitude test and the E.U. brightline test. A prohibition on trading the securities of a corporation based on
inside information applies to those in possession of information from the
point in time when the said information is considered material and until
such time as it is disclosed. In both jurisdictions considered here, a piece
of information is likely to be material if a reasonable investor is likely to
use it in making his investment decision.71
68. For example, if a corporation conducts confidential but material negotiations with other parties
or deliberates the sale of a material unit, Article 17 of the MAR implies that such processes should be
disclosed to the public unless the conditions for delayed disclosure are met. See supra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text.
69. See Pietrancosta, supra note 46, at 53-55 (noting that the persons that are in charge of
disclosure may not be identical to those that are subject to the insider trading prohibition and therefore the
MAR obliges firms to keep lists of insiders so that they can be notified when a delay in disclosure of
inside information occurs). Pietrancosta argues that the ability to postpone disclosure of information in
real time is critical. He rejects the claim that this is a victory of “micro interests” of the issuers over the
“macro-interest” of investors in the capital market. Pietrancosta argues that no issuer will be willing to
list in a “modern-type financial Panopticon” where he is continuously under the public eye. Id. at 57. We
concur with this approach, but we also argue that it reinforces our claim that materiality thresholds should
be designed in a way that takes into consideration which information is most important to investors. See
infra Section IV.B.
70. See Pietrancosta, supra note 46, at 55-56. The ECJ in Geltl raises the concern that undisclosed
intermediate steps in a protracted process will put the investors in a position that is insufficiently protected
against the improper use of inside information. See Case C-19/11, Markus Geltl v. Daimler AG,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:397 ¶ 35 (2012).
71. Marco Ventoruzzo & Chiarra Picciau, Article 7: Inside Information, in MARKET ABUSE
REGULATION COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE, supra note 45, at 175, 200.
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Consider a corporation seeking to enter a transaction with another
entity. The process often starts with initial negotiations, followed by a
letter of intent, then a memorandum of understanding (MoU), a due
diligence process, and finally a concluding agreement. The time gap
between each of these steps could range from hours to years. Because a
deal might go sour at any of these stages, only when it is fully
consummated can one claim with absolute certainty that it is final.
The E.U. test focuses on the likelihood of the foreseen transaction
being consummated. Hence, the test can be treated as a bright-line rule
because when the likelihood threshold of the future transaction is crossed,
the information regarding it becomes material.
The E.U. test is not a conventional bright-line rule. A conventional
bright-line rule relies on a set of facts, circumstances, or hard verifiable
information. For example, the signing of an MoU that contains the basic
terms of the transaction and the price to be paid therein. The E.U. test is
somewhat more complicated because it requires a subjective assessment
of whether a particular set of “precise” facts or circumstances indicates
that the transaction is more likely than not to occur.72
The European bright-line test is not restricted to transactions. The test
can be applied to any developing event that can be broken down into
steps,73 such as a developing medical condition corporation’s founderCEO. At its initial stages, the illness may have no immediate effect on the
CEO’s performance, and there may be a likelihood of full recovery. But
as the illness progresses, there is an increasing probability that the CEO
will have to retire at some point. A foreseeable early retirement becomes
material information at the moment the likelihood bright-line is crossed,
which may happen just before the CEO is no longer able to perform
adequately.
Although it is probabilistic, the E.U. bright-line test still differs from
the U.S. test in that it always requires an ex ante assessment of probability,
based on a clear and verifiable set of facts or circumstances. Obviously,
72. Id. at 180-181 (stressing that for information to be “precise” it must be specific or deal with a
set of circumstantial facts).
73. European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) guidelines on delayed disclosure include
various examples of uncertain situations that would require disclosure but also may justify a delayed
disclosure: for example, “ongoing negotiations… where the outcome or normal pattern of those
negotiations would be likely to be affected by public disclosure” or negotiations to prevent an event in
which “the financial viability of the issuer is in grave and imminent danger, although not within the scope
of the applicable insolvency law.” European Securities and Markets Authority, Final Report: Guidelines
on the Market Abuse Regulation - Market Soundings and Delay of Disclosure of Inside Information (13
July 2016). According to the ESMA, the announcement of a merger that is subject to regulatory approval
cannot be delayed and must include the foreseen regulatory hurdles. However, a delayed disclosure would
be legitimate with regard to the announcement of additional regulatory conditions imposed by the
authority after a merger such as the sale of a corporate unit or a corporate activity in a particular geographic
region or a prudential requirement to increase capitalization. Id. at 17-18.
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determining the probability of a future event is very difficult.74
Nonetheless, the European rule emphasizes that the probability of the
event needs to be substantial. For a future event to be considered material,
mere possibility is not enough. The probability must be clearly
“positive.”75 This stands in stark contrast to the U.S. test which has no
lower probability boundary below which future events are never
considered material.
Magnitude is not entirely overlooked by the E.U. regulation. It is
supposed to be considered by the requirement in Article 7 of the MAR
that the expected price movement of the corporation’s financial
instruments will be “significant.”76 However, this condition raises a host
of problems. For example, price movements are dependent on the
subjective evaluations of investors and traders in the market. The
efficiency of the market also influences price movements pursuant to
disclosure of new information. In addition, sometimes the price of a share
that was likely to drop as the result of a pessimistic market outlook would
actually remain unchanged if any positive inside information about a
potential future event is disclosed. It is unclear whether this lack of change
is included in the definition of a “significant” effect on the price. These
complexities stem from the fact that the E.U. regulation chooses to focus
on the effect of the facts, or the circumstances on the financial
instrument’s price, rather than to evaluate the effect of the final event’s
magnitude on the corporation, as in the U.S. probability/magnitude test.77
The probability/magnitude test, in many cases, is easier or simpler to
estimate. It is no wonder then that European case law seems to avoid or
at least downplay the role of price effect in the determination of
materiality.78
The U.S. test focuses both on the probability that the event will take
place and on the expected magnitude of its final effect on the corporation.
Unlike the European test, the U.S. test does not require that the
information be “precise.”79 This is an important difference because the
74. Ventoruzzo & Picciau, supra note 71, at 196 (arguing that determining the probability of a
future event is “not really possible in purely abstract terms”).
75. Id. at 192 (stressing that the probability must be “50% +1”).
76. The direction of the effect on the price is irrelevant. Id. at 193.
77. Id. at 196 (arguing that adopting the probability/magnitude test would dispel some of the
ambiguity of the E.U. regulation).
78. In the case of Spector Photo Group, the ECJ refused to discuss what a “significant” effect
might mean and stressed that “[N]o fixed or even indicative threshold . . . appears appropriate,” leaving
the matter largely open to case-by-case interpretation. See Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group NV v.
CBFA ¶¶ 66-69 (2009). See also Ventoruzzo & Picciau, supra note 71, at 204.
79. Article 7 of the MAR’s requirement that inside information be both “precise” and “relevant
for investment choices” clearly differentiates the E.U. rule from the U.S. probability/magnitude test,
“according to which even not perfectly defined events or sets of circumstances could be relevant if the
probability of their occurrence is high enough . . ..” See Ventoruzzo & Picciau, supra note 71, at 203.
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test may deem future events that are large in magnitude but low in
probability due their vague initial state as material.80
The difference between the tests means that the same uncertain event
will become material at a different point in time in Europe and in the U.S.,
depending on which test is applied. Consider two identical corporations,
each subject to a different materiality regime, facing the same major
future event. Under the U.S. test, information about a future event of great
magnitude may become material at a relatively early stage, even if the
probability of the event taking place is lower than the standard bright-line
likelihood. Thus, the U.S. test triggers earlier application of insider
trading restrictions regarding future events of great magnitude.
Future events of smaller magnitude, however, may not be considered
material information in the U.S. until a relatively advanced stage, when
their likelihood of occurring is high. Under the European regime,
information about a future event of smaller magnitude is subject to a
disclosure obligation when the bright-line likelihood threshold is crossed,
on the assumption that the event is expected to generate a significant
effect on the price of the corporation's shares. This means that unless the
corporation decides to delay the disclosure of this information,81 it will
have to be disclosed at this point.82
In other words, events of smaller magnitude are generally considered
material earlier under the European than under the U.S. regime. This
result could be dampened by the E.U. condition that the information must
have a “significant” effect on the price. If the information concerns a
80. The definition of inside information in the MAR includes a particular clarification regarding
protracted processes like mergers, making it clear that intermediate steps can and should be addressed as
material information if the conditions of article 7 of the MAR are met. The wording of Article 7(3) MAR
is interpreted in the literature as meaning that for an intermediate step to be considered material it must
be “precise” and have in and of itself a significant effect on the price of the corporation’s financial
instruments. See Ventoruzzo & Picciau, supra note 71, at 204. This is different from the U.S.
probability/magnitude test first because the latter test does not require precision or specificity of
circumstances, and second because the U.S. rule looks at any given time at the final effect of the event on
the corporation, whereas the E.U. intermediate step requires an evaluation of the potential effect that
disclosure of the intermediate step will have on the price of the financial instrument. Some European
scholars argue that the ECJ has relaxed the precision requirement in its decision in Lafonta but the
probability threshold remains higher than in the U.S. See Mario Hoessl-Neumann & Andreas
Baumgartner, Dealing with Corporate Scandal Under European Market Abuse Law: The Case of VW 18
(Stanford-Vienna
European
Union
Law
Working
Paper
No.
37,
2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3281009.
81. See supra notes 59-62and accompanying text. See also Alain Pietrancosta, Public Disclosure
of Inside Information, in MARKET ABUSE REGULATION COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE, supra
note 46, at 343, 372-375 (arguing that the process of delaying disclosure is highly formal, open to close
regulatory scrutiny, and the right to delay should be interpreted narrowly).
82. The pressure to disclose in the MAR is very strong. Marco Ventoruzzo, The Concept of Insider
Dealing, in MARKET ABUSE REGULATION COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE, supra note 46, at 13,
14 (describing the relationship between the duty to disclose and the prohibition on insider trading in the
current E.U. regulation as “abstain and disclose” rather than the classic “disclose or abstain”).
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relatively small event, then there might be no significant effect, ergo no
materiality. However, even relatively small expected changes in the price
may be considered significant in some cases.83
A numeric example can help illustrate our observations. Consider a
corporation with an annual pretax profit of $1,000. The corporation is
negotiating a transaction that is expected to increase its annual profit by
$200. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the magnitude of the
transaction does not change during the negotiations. In order to compare
the two materiality tests, we must also assume that there is an expectation
that the price of the corporation’s shares will fully and exactly capture the
magnitude of the transaction once it is disclosed, in accordance with the
semi-strong Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).84 Let us assume further
that the threshold for materiality is a 5% or higher change in the projected
profit of the corporation. In this case, the transaction is expected to
increase the profit by 20%, and will therefore have a material impact on
the corporation when it is consummated. At what point in the process of
negotiating and bringing the transaction to closure does the information
about the future transaction become material?
Under the U.S. probability/magnitude test, the corporation must
evaluate both components throughout the negotiation process. Given that
the annual profit is $1,000, the information about the future deal is
considered material at a relatively early stage, when the probability of
consummation is 25%. This is because the expected profit of $200 ´ 25%
equals $50, which represents an expected increase of 5% over the known
annual profit and therefore reaches the threshold of materiality.
Under the European bright-line test, information about the future deal
should be disclosed when the precise facts indicate that the event is likely
to take place. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that likelihood of
the occurrence of the future event is 50%, although it may in reality be
somewhat higher. It is clear that under the European rule this transaction
will become material, i.e., inside information, at a later stage than under
the U.S. test. Therefore, whether it takes the transaction a day, a week or
a month to progress from the 25% stage to the more-likely-than-not stage,
European insiders can use this time to legally trade on the basis of this
information, while U.S. insiders would be breaking the law if they
engaged in the same actions.
The above numeric example assumes a large transaction. The results
are reversed if we examine a transaction of smaller magnitude, such as
one that is expected to yield a profit of only $60. This transaction would
83. See Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group NV v. CBFA ¶¶ 66-69 (2009). See also Ventoruzzo &
Picciau, supra note 71, at 204.
84. According to the semi-strong form of the EMH, stock prices instantly change to reflect new
public information. See Fama, supra note 12, at 404-409.
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also be material when finalized because it would increase profits by 6%.
According to the U.S. probability/magnitude test, the information about
the future transaction will become material only when the probability of
it being finalized is approximately 84%.85 But under the European test,
the information becomes material when the information is sufficiently
precise and the likelihood threshold is crossed. Therefore, the information
becomes material much earlier in the E.U. than in the U.S. This implies
that the prohibition on insider trading is also triggered earlier in the E.U.
than in the U.S.86
In conclusion, the possession of private information about future events
is a strong incentive to trade on the basis of such information. The earlier
the materiality threshold is crossed, the more difficult it is for insiders to
use the information for insider trading. This is because the period of time
between the burgeoning of a process and the mandated threshold of its
becoming material is shortened. The interjurisdictional difference in the
materiality thresholds of high-magnitude future events suggests that the
restrictions on insider trading apply in the U.S. before they do in the E.U.
U.S. regulators appear to replace the broad European ex ante disclosure
regime with strict ex post enforcement of insider trading prohibitions,
which Armour et al. described as “the most zealous” in the world.87
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DEFINING MATERIALITY DIFFERENTLY
The interjurisdictional difference in determining materiality is not
merely a theoretical exercise. It has implications for transnational
corporations that may seize regulatory arbitrage opportunities to avoid
burdensome disclosure regimes and the associated liability. The
difference also has implications in the case of cross-border mergers and
85. Indeed, if the profit from an expected transaction in our example is $50, according to the
European standard the information regarding the transaction will become material when it is likely to be
finalized, whereas under the U.S. test it becomes material only when the transaction is absolutely final.
86. Because of the European court’s fuzzy interpretation of the term “significant” change in the
price, the result with regard to the difference in the timing of materiality under the two tests may be weak
in smaller events. However, smaller events are by definition less important to investors and present less
profits for opportunistic insiders. Our example shows robustly that in events of larger magnitude the two
tests trigger materiality at significantly different times.
87. John Armour, Martin Bengtzen, & Luca Enriques, Investor Choice in Global Securities
Markets 58 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 371, 2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3047734. See also Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan & Ian Ramsay, The Extent
and Intensity of Insider Trading Enforcement – an International Comparison, 2016 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1
(2016) (an international comparison of public enforcement of insider trading, concluding that the U.S.
imposes the highest dollar value sanctions); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Accounting and Financial
reporting: Global Aspirations, Local realities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE 489, 496 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (few countries match the
intensity of U.S. enforcement in securities regulation); Pietrancosta, supra note 46, at 57 (hinting that the
E.U.’s strict disclosure regime may be a response to weak enforcement of securities laws).
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acquisitions of listed corporations. This Part addresses the risks posed by
the interjurisdictional difference in defining materiality to the
enforcement of insider trading prohibitions.
A. Transnational Corporations
In the global modern world, companies look beyond the limits of their
domestic market. For example, Volkswagen, whose headquarters is in
Wolfsburg, Germany,88 has plants in many parts of the world, including
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, and the U.S.89 Its vehicles are sold
worldwide.90 In 2016, Volkswagen was the largest automaker based on
worldwide sales.91 And although the Frankfurt Stock Exchange is the
primary place of listing for its stock, the Volkswagen-sponsored ADRs
are also traded over-the-counter in the U.S.92
Following the exposure of the Dieselgate emissions scandal, in
September 2015, collective action proceedings have been launched
against Volkswagen in the U.S., where the manipulations were revealed,
and in Germany, where the key decisions were made and where all of the
company’s decision makers are located.93 These legal proceedings focus
on whether Volkswagen violated securities laws by delaying the
disclosure of the EPA’s discovery of its manipulation of emissions tests
in the U.S. In Germany, there is also an investigation into alleged
violations of inside information restrictions.
Because the discovery by U.S. authorities of the Volkswagen
manipulation is an event that has implications of great magnitude, the
information about this event and its direct implications becomes material
at an earlier stage under the U.S. probability/magnitude test than under
the E.U. test. This is because, as discussed earlier, information about a
significant future event may become material under the U.S. test even
when the likelihood of the event taking place is lower whereas it would
not become material under the E.U. bright-line test. Although the basic
facts of the legal proceedings against Volkswagen are the same in the U.S.
88. See VOLKSWAGEN, https://www.volkswagenag.com/en.html.
89. See VOLKSWAGEN, https://www.volkswagen-karriere.de/en/unsere-standorte/volkswagen-imausland.html.
90. Nathan Bomey, Volkswagen passes Toyota as world's largest automaker despite scandal, USA
TODAY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/01/30/volkswagen-toyotaworld-largest-automaker/97234320/.
91. Id.
92. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC)3:15-md-02672-CRB, 2017 WL 66281, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4,
2017).
93. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
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and the E.U., the jurisdictions’ approaches to determining when the
discovery of the scandal became material may lead to significantly
different outcomes.
Volkswagen’s method of raising capital in the U.S. is rather
fascinating. It has been interested in raising capital in the U.S., but the
German conglomerate preferred not to expose itself to U.S. securities
regulation. Therefore, instead of listing its shares on one of the U.S. stock
exchanges, Volkswagen sponsored Level 1 ADRs on OTC market
platforms.94 Generally, there are three levels of ADRs—Level 1, Level 2,
and Level 3—each representing the extent to which the foreign company
chooses to access the U.S. securities market. Level 1 reflects the least
contact with the U.S. market.95 The increasing number of Level 1 ADR
listings in the U.S. attests to the fact that more and more non-U.S.
corporations seek access to the U.S. capital markets but often try to avoid
the burdensome implications of the U.S. securities regime.96 Volkswagen
clearly designed its U.S. listing in a way that reduced its exposure to U.S.
securities regulation, including the probability/magnitude test. The U.S.
court declined to dismiss a 10b-5 class action, which argued that
Volkswagen’s statements were false or misleading, on the grounds that
the choice of Level 1 ADRs makes the company subject only to the
disclosure regime in effect in Germany.97
The discrepancy in the materiality regimes described in this Article
creates a race-to-the-bottom effect. When harmonization efforts in
securities regulation increase,98 even what seems to be a minor
discrepancy becomes a regulatory arbitrage opportunity. The popularity
of ADRs can be explained by the lower regulatory costs they impose on
corporations, but investors are likely to be unaware of the implications of
the materiality regime discrepancies and may find themselves at a
disadvantage.99
94. Although treated as shares, “an ADR is the physical certificate that evidences [an] ADS . . .
and an ADS is the security that represents an ownership interest in deposited securities . . ..” SEC Release
No. 33-6894 (May 23, 1991).
95. See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin: American Depositary
Receipts (Aug. 2012), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf.
96. A study from 2015 found that most German companies that cross-listed their shares in the U.S.
had de-listed by 2010, leaving only five cross-listed corporations subject to the U.S. securities law. In
contrast, “95 German companies continue to cross-trade in the U.S. on the OTC market as Level 1 ADRs.
By so doing, these companies enjoy the cross-listing advantages of broadening their investor base and
increased visibility in the U.S., but without incurring the costs of complying with SOX and other SEC
regulatory requirements.” See Wolfgang Bessler, Fred R. Kaen, & Colin Schneck, The Cross-Listing and
Cross-Trading of German Companies in the U.S. and of Foreign Companies in Germany, 27 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 58, 66 (2015).
97. In re Volkswagen, 2017 WL 66281 at *6.
98. See infra Section IV.A.
99. See Investor Bulletin: American Depositary Receipts, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf (warning investors specifically that “non-U.S.
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It is important to note that potential confusion awaits not only
investors, but also international corporations, particularly those with
subsidiaries in different countries. For example, consider the CEO of a
U.S. subsidiary of a listed German corporation who holds Level 1 ADRs
of the German parent corporation. Consider a hypothetical in which said
CEO learns about a potentially negative development for the
conglomerate. The parent corporation will base the decision whether to
disclose the information on the European bright-line test. Hence, if the
parent corporation’s statement is inaccurate or delayed, an action to
impose civil liability on the German corporation can be filed in a U.S.
court, but would be adjudicated according to the European test.100 But if
the CEO of the U.S. subsidiary trades in the ADRs while holding the
material nonpublic information, the materiality test of the information for
the purpose of insider trading enforcement will be the U.S.
probability/magnitude test.
This leads to the biggest concern: insider trading. The prohibition on
insider trading is one of the foundations of U.S securities regulation.101
The hidden materiality regime discrepancies described in the previous
Part not only undermine the protection of cross-border investors in
corporations that are subject to the European bright-line test, but also
create strong incentives for insiders to act strategically in order to
maximize profits at the expense of unaware investors.
companies are subject to financial and other disclosure requirements that differ from those required of
U.S. public companies . . . Any disclosure may also not be as extensive or comparable to that of U.S.
public companies”).
100. According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011) (“[f]or purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”). When a parent corporation exerts sufficient control over the activity of a foreign
subsidiary, a court is likely to recognize this type of ultimate liability. See In re Rocket Fuel, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 14-CV-3998PJH, 2015 WL 9311921, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015). Very recently the U.S.
Supreme Court also held that a disseminator of a statement who was not the “maker” of that statement
can be held primarily liable for fraudulent misstatements under Rules 10(b)-5(a) and (c), thereby opening
the door for potential divergence in liability for such statements between a “maker” subject to liability in
Europe and a disseminator subject to liability in the U.S. See Lorenzo v. SEC, Case 17-1077, 2019 WL
1369839 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2019).
101. The U.S. is considered the first to have enacted anti-insider trading laws, with the major
securities Acts being enacted in 1933 and 1934. Most E.U. countries, however, only started regulating
insider trading only in the 1990s. The U.S. and the E.U. have different theoretical approaches to insider
trading. In the U.S., the prohibition on insider trading is founded on fiduciary duties of the insider towards
the corporation, whereas the E.U. probation is based on a parity-of-information approach. See Ventoruzzo,
supra note 82, at 13-19. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the fiduciary duty rationale in the famous
Chiarella case. See Chiarella v. United States 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642 (1997) it broadened the prohibition to cases in which the trader misappropriated inside information
belonging to the corporation. The discussion of the theoretical rationales for imposing insider trading
prohibitions is outside the scope of this Article, which focuses on the implications of using different tests
for determining when information becomes inside information. This legal determination precedes the
question of whether the information has been used unlawfully.
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Financial research shows that managers engage in insider trading.102
The premise that insider trading opportunities distort managerial
decision-making is also practically undisputed.103 There is ample
evidence that managerial delay of timely disclosures is often caused by
the ability to trade on inside information.104 Managers, as corporate
insiders, are likely to distort corporate decision-making for personal
gains, particularly if this kind of distortion is legal and poses no risk of
sanctions. The discrepancy between the U.S. and the E.U. tests for
determining materiality presents such an opportunity.105
Consider now a German CEO who holds shares in the German parent
corporation, as opposed to the CEO of the U.S. subsidiary who holds
Level-1-ADRs. Assume that both managers come into possession of
information about the devastating, yet imprecise implications of an
unfolding investigation into corporate wrongdoing. For the CEO of the
U.S. subsidiary, the probability/magnitude test triggers an immediate
prohibition on insider trading. By contrast, the German CEO gets a golden
opportunity to dump the toxic shares before the information becomes
specific and precise enough to be considered inside information under
E.U. bright-line test.
The possibility of profiting (or avoiding a loss) from information
before it becomes material harms the corporation and its shareholders in
many ways. For example, insiders are likely to spend more time trying to
obtain information rather than conducting their corporate duties in order
to line their own pockets. Moreover, when insiders have an influence on
corporate decisions, they have an incentive to distort these decisions in
ways that create trading opportunities that would be prohibited under U.S.
securities regulation.106

102. See Anastasia Kraft, Bong Soo Lee & Kerstin Lopatta, Management Earnings Forecasts,
Insider Trading, and Information Asymmetry 26 J. CORP. FIN. 96 (2014).
103. In fact, even the greatest opponent of insider trading restrictions, Henry Manne, concedes that
inside information creates profit opportunities and hence can incentivize managerial behavior. Manne’s
highly contested argument was that insider trading is a legitimate method of rewarding managers for profit
maximization. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Ronald A.
Dye, Insider Trading and Incentives, 57 J. BUS. 295 (1984).
104. See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1053-60 (1982).
105. Research on jurisdictional differences in the level of insider trading restrictions argues that
differences in remuneration levels are explained by the ability of managers to profit from laxer insider
trading laws. See David J. Denis & Jin Xu, Insider Trading Restrictions and Top Executive Compensation,
56 J. ACCOUNTING & ECON. 91 (2013).
106. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Information Advantages under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
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B. Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
The last decade saw some of the largest cross-border mergers and
acquisitions in both directions between the U.S. and Europe, and 2017
marked a record year for such transactions.107 The trend continued in
2018, with mega-cross-border mergers such as the U.S. cable giant
Comcast bidding $39 billion to acquire Sky, a leading British
telecommunications conglomerate.108 In another mega-merger, the U.K.based multinational telecom giant, Vodafone, took over the European
activities of Liberty Global, a large telecom company traded on the
Nasdaq and controlled by U.S. billionaire, John C. Malone.109 Some
M&A efforts that eventually failed are also instructive from the investors’
perspective: for example, the bid by U.S. pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer, to
acquire the Anglo-Swedish corporation, Astra-Zeneca, in 2014;110 the
failed attempt of U.S.-based Omnicom to merge with French Publicis the
same year;111 or the recently failed attempt of the largest U.S.incorporated smartphone chip-maker, Qualcomm, to acquire the Dutch
NXP Semiconductors.112
An example of a successfully closed deal is German pharmaceutical
company Bayer AG’s acquisition of U.S. agrichemical corporation
Monsanto. The deal was announced on September 14, 2016, but the first
offer from Bayer to Monsanto had taken place months earlier, on May 10,
2016.113 From the perspective of Monsanto, in the months between the
107. Pamela Barbaglia, Cross-border M&A between U.S. and European firms at 10 year high,
REUTERS (May 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-usa-deals/cross-border-mabetween-u-s-and-european-firms-at-10-year-high-idUSKBN18I1M6.
108. Doreen Mccallister, Comcast Outbids Fox and Will Acquire British Broadcaster Sky, NPR
(Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/23/650845008/comcast-outbids-fox-and-will-acquirebritish-broadcaster-sky.
109. Vodafone to Acquire Liberty Global’s Operations in Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Romania, VODAFONE (May 9, 2018), https://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/vodafonegroup-releases/2018/vodafone-liberty-global-operations-germany-czech-republic-hungaryromania.html.
110. Rupert Neate & Sean Farrell, Pfizer pulls out of fight for AstraZeneca, THE GUARDIAN (May
19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/19/pfizer-pulls-out-battle-pharmaceuticaltakeover-astrazeneca.
111. Publicis-Omnicom $35bn Merger Deal Called Off, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-27336870.
112. Press Release: Qualcomm Announces Termination of NXP Acquisition and Board
Authorization for $30 Billion Stock Repurchase Program, QUALCOMM (July 26, 2018),
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2018/07/26/qualcomm-announces-termination-nxpacquisition-and-board-authorization-30.
113. Bayer and Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture, BAYER AG (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://media.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/ADSF8F-Bayer-and-Monsanto-to-Create-a-GlobalLeader-in-Agriculture. The companies needed two more years to finalize the deal after the announcement.
See Bayer Closes Monsanto Acquisition, MONSANTO (June 7, 2018), https://monsanto.com/newsreleases/bayer-closes-monsanto-acquisition.
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first offer and the formal announcement, the information about the
potential acquisition would have been considered material at a relatively
early stage if the U.S. probability/magnitude test governed. By contrast,
from the point of view of Bayer, the materiality threshold was reached
late if the European bright-line test governed. Although the corporations
announced the deal together, the corporate officers were subject to
different “silent periods”—the term used to describe the time during
which insiders are banned from trading because they are in possession of
material nonpublic information. The time-arbitrage creates an incentive
for insiders to trade on information not yet considered material in their
regime.114
Similarly, in 2015, the American international delivery company
FedEx, listed on the NYSE, acquired TNT Express, a European and
global delivery corporation listed on the Dutch stock exchange, for $4.8
billion.115 The two corporations announced the deal simultaneously,116
but because of the different materiality regimes, the U.S. corporate
insiders at FedEx were subject to insider trading restrictions much earlier
than were their Dutch counterparts.
In 2017, the Nasdaq-listed U.S. food company Kraft-Heinz attempted
to take over the even larger European conglomerate Unilever, listed on
both the London and the Dutch stock exchanges.117 Kraft-Heinz initially
approached Unilever confidentially, but later confirmed that a bid was
made. Only after the public confirmation did the board of Unilever
confirm receiving the bid and rejecting it, despite its being priced 18%
above the London closing price of Unilever. The information about the
bid triggered a surge in the price of Unilever stock.118 In this case, the
initial approach by Kraft-Heinz would have been considered material
information according to the U.S. test because of the magnitude of the
event, although the potential acquisition was far from certain. In contrast,
the offer did not cross the European bright-line threshold, making it
particularly attractive for insiders of the target company to trade on the
114. A study conducted in the U.S. indicates that the time period between the occurrence of an event
and its subsequent disclosure is particularly attractive for insider trading. See Alma Cohen, Robert J.
Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, The 8-K Trading Gap (Colum. Law Sch., Colum. Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 524, 2015), ssrn.com/abstract_id=2657877.
115. Chad Bray, FedEx Agrees to Acquire TNT Express in $4.8 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/business/dealbook/fedex-agrees-to-acquire-tnt-express-in4-8-billion-deal.html.
116. Id.
117. Martinne Geller & Pamela Barbaglia, Kraft Heinz bids $143 billion for Unilever in global
brand grab, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unilever-m-a-kraft/kraft-heinzbids-143-billion-for-unilever-in-global-brand-grab-idUSKBN15W18Y.
118. Will Martin, Unilever, the £112 billion maker of the world’s most popular brands, rejected a
takeover bid from Kraft Heinz, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2017), http://uk.businessinsider.com/kraftconfirms-unilever-merger-approach-2017-2.
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basis of their private information.
In the case of cross-border transactions, the arbitrage created by the
divergence in the threshold of materiality has two consequences. First,
even when the announcement about the merger is coordinated and made
jointly, as was the case in some of the deals discussed above, the different
materiality regimes mean that the information about the ongoing
negotiations becomes material at different points in time for the European
and the U.S. corporate insiders, thereby producing a dangerous gap in the
application of insider trading prohibitions. Because the U.S.
probability/magnitude test comes into effect earlier when the deal’s
magnitude is larger, European stock exchanges are exposed to regulatoryarbitrage-based trading by insiders in cross-border M&A situations.119
Furthermore, given that the application of the European materiality test
to intermediate deal steps depends on the deal’s precise facts or a
verifiable set of circumstances, top insiders have an incentive to
strategically navigate negotiations in a way that delays the triggering of
insider trading prohibitions. For example, managers may structure the
outline of a merger without agreeing on the price or draw out the process
of drafting an MoU for as long as they need in order to acquire a favorable
position in the stock market. Such opportunistic behavior not only
undermines the parity-of-information in the market but also harms the
corporation itself. It harms the coporation first because transactions are
not concluded as efficiently and quickly as they should, and second
because managers have an incentive to seek those transactions that create
legitimate insider trading opportunities, even if these are not necessarily
the optimal deals that further the corporation’s interest.120
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: A GLOBAL TEST
This Part proposes adopting the probability/magnitude test as the
global test for determining the materiality of future events. The proposal
is based on both the advantages of harmonizing securities regulation and
the superiority of the probability/magnitude test over the alternative
bright-line test.

119. Even uncertain information that is not material can still be valuable. See Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 809 (2014) (arguing that insiders can profit from
“sub-material” information). This is particularly true for initial very uncertain information about highmagnitude events. The U.S. probability/magnitude test puts such potential information under the
restriction of the insider trading blanket, whereas the E.U. bright-line test fails to do so and also fails to
impose disclosure.
120. Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L.
REV. 117, 148 (1982) (arguing that managerial incentives may result in allocative inefficiency by
encouraging overinvestment in activities that generate opportunities for insider trading).
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A. Harmonizing Securities Regulation
The globalization of world securities markets has become a wellestablished fact shown both in multinational offerings by issuers and in
investment in foreign securities by investors. 121 Many companies choose
to raise capital or list their shares on foreign markets. By the end of 2015,
923 foreign companies were registered with the U.S. SEC and reported
according to its Rules.122 Investors worldwide look beyond the limits of
their domestic markets for investment opportunities.123 Along these lines,
investors tend to diversify their portfolios between several markets to
minimize risks and to take advantage of fluctuations in currency exchange
rates.124 Technology affords investors nearly limitless investment
opportunities around the globe.125
Research has shown that the harmonization of securities regulation in
the global market would result in a more efficient securities market, a
significant reduction in the cost of equity, a higher level of investor
protection, pooling of the expertise and experience of the world’s
securities regulators, and an end to the international race-to-the-bottom in
securities regulation.126 To this end, this Article proposes a global rule for
121. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic
Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SER. RES. 349, 349-367 (1990) (analyzing the process of
internationalization of securities markets and its causes); Susan Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on A
Blueprint from Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 69, 69–70 (2007) (“Globalization is a fact. Innovative technologies are driving faster and more
efficient trading, and they do not recognize national borders. Capital market participants are expanding
their business activities into foreign markets. Investors are seeking international investment
opportunities.”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 31 (1999) (“[S]ecurities trading has become globalized and stock exchanges conduct
business in a manner that transcends national boundaries.”); David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and
Institutional Conditions for an International Securities Market, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 47 (1991) (describing
the reasons for the internationalization of securities markets).
122. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, International Registered and Reporting Companies
(Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml. A reporting company
is a company registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq.
123. See, e.g., U.S. Competitiveness and Trade Policy in the Global Economy: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1994) (Statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, concerning International Markets and
Individual Investors), available in 1994 WL 525473 (F.D.C.H.) (“Just as no man is an island, no investor
today is only a domestic investor. We are all, whether we like it or not, affected by developments in the
international securities markets.”)
124. For the advantages stemming from the diversification of investment portfolios, see RICHARD
A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196–98 (10th ed. 2011).
125. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global Investing,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 86 (2007).
126. See Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global
Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241 (1997) (citing various economic theories to support the argument
that harmonization is the most efficient approach for regulating securities disclosure rules in the global
market); Grundfest, supra note 120, at 370-73 (suggesting that the harmonization of securities registration
requirements would reduce costs for international investing); Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the
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determining when an uncertain future event should be deemed material
information.
Opponents of the harmonization of international securities regulation
argue that such an approach would eliminate the benefits of regulatory
competition.127 It may also create a suboptimal regulatory regime because
harmonization hinders regulatory innovation and prevents a race-to-thetop, as national regulators compete to attract issuers, investors, and other
market players.128 This argument has some merit, but not in the present
context. Note that in the U.S. securities market, both tests for determining
the materiality of information regarding future events—the
probability/magnitude test and the bright-line agreement-in-principle
test—were implemented by courts.129 The regulatory competition
between the two tests ended with the decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Basic and TGS concerning the superiority of the probability/magnitude
over the agreement-in-principle test. The superiority of the
probability/magnitude test is proven by its survival, despite the difficulty
it imposes on market participants, which in many cases are powerful
corporations and senior executives with considerable financial means,
that are able to influence the shaping of norms.
B. The Superiority of the Probability/Magnitude Test
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic and in TGS address
and reject the potential downsides of the probability/magnitude test but
fail to discuss its advantages in detail. This Article focuses on the
advantages of adopting the probability/magnitude test as the global test
for insider trading prohibitions.
First, the greater the magnitude of the event, the higher the expected
profit that can be gained from information about the event before its
disclosure. The U.S. regime casts a wider net across potentially lucrative
inside information about unfolding events to guarantee enforcement of
insider trading prohibitions at an earlier stage than does the European rule.
Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010) (arguing that harmonization of international securities regulation will
help minimize risks in the emerging capital markets, increase market efficiency, and pool the expertise
and experience of securities regulators worldwide).
127. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation,
2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) (arguing that regulatory competition is desirable over a uniform
international regulatory scheme); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (arguing for “competitive federalism” as a system of
securities regulation).
128. See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 255, 256 (2007) (“[R]egulatory competition fosters innovation because countries must compete
with each other to attract market participants.”).
129. See supra Section II.A.
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Hence, the probability/magnitude test would be better suited to promote
parity-of-information in the securities market. Furthermore, since insider
trading undermines trust in the integrity of markets, this Article should
raise particular concerns for U.S. investors whose capital is subject to
E.U. regulation. Adopting the U.S. test would increase investor protection
and trust and consequently incentivize for cross-border financial
investments.
Second, the probability/magnitude test evaluates whether the
information under review will have an effect on the corporation. In
contrast, the E.U bright-line test focuses on the future event’s effect on
the value of the corporation’s financial instruments. Clearly, some
information is important for the corporation and its stakeholders even if
the value of the corporation’s shares will not be affected by it. For
example, a planned change in the leadership of the corporation in which
a respected CEO will step down to make place for a long-groomed and
well-prepared successor may not cause a significant change in the value
of the corporation’s shares, but surely will be considered material for
investors and insiders alike. Moreover, the focus of the European test on
the share price movements rather than the influence on the corporation is
problematic for several reasons: price movements are dependent on the
subjective evaluations of investors and traders in the market; they may be
affected by various factors other than the newly discovered information;
and the efficiency of the market also influences price movements pursuant
to disclosure of new information.
Third, the probability/magnitude test is fact-intensive,130 but not factspecific. The test thereby has the potential to improve corporate
governance and decrease managerial opportunism. This is because the
probability/magnitude test requires an ongoing evaluation of the facts of
the unfolding event in real time to make a decision on its materiality. In
terms of insider trading prohibitions, the test requires those corporate
officers in charge of compliance to be fully updated at all times and
consequently improves the efficiency of the company’s flow of
information.
It follows that the probability/magnitude test also guarantees that when
corporations disclose intermediate steps, these disclosures will at all times
be up to date, incorporating changes in the information as soon as they
happen. At the same time, the wider net of information covered by the
U.S. test and the fact that the test will not be triggered by a set of specific
facts means that it will be harder for insiders, even in top positions, to
opportunistically manipulate corporate decision-making or anticipate it in
130. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2071 (3rd ed. 1989); Stefan J.
Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES L.
REV. 143, 153 (2010).
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ways that create profits from inside information.
Fourth, the probability/magnitude test is universal in that it can be
applied to any type of information regarding uncertain events. By
contrast, the agreement-in-principle test generally fits agreement-related
situations, but is difficult to mold to an event that takes on other forms. It
could be argued that the agreement-in-principle test is merely one
manifestation of a bright-line rule, and that such a rule can be developed
separately for each type of future event. Indeed, the E.U. test is a
probabilistic test, but it still requires precise facts or a set of verifiable
circumstances in order to be triggered. In other words, courts would have
to develop specific factual or circumstantial thresholds on a case-by-case
basis that can be applied to certain categories of future events. This type
of regime has two important disadvantages. First, courts would have to
spend significant judicial resources to develop bright-line rules for each
and every case at hand.131 Second, given the complexity of real-life future
events, in many situations, corporate decision makers would face
uncertainty with regard to the applicable bright-line rule until such a rule
is developed by the courts. Moreover, even if rules have already been
developed, courts in different jurisdictions may adopt different rules in
similar cases, generating confusion for market players.
Finally, the European markets are characterized by the prevalence of
corporations controlled by blockholders (an individual investor or group
of investors).132 Because the interests of significant blockholders are often
represented on the board of the corporation, there is a higher likelihood
that they will be privy at an early stage to nonpublic information about
consequential future events in the life of a publicly held corporation.133
To the extent that exposure to private information is currently used for
trading on the basis of such information by insiders within corporations
or by blockholders,134 such trading would be restricted under the

131. Partnoy argues that because of the complexity of the current financial world, standards should
be preferred over rules as a disclosure regime. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the
Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1262-69 (2003). The legal literature has discussed
intensively the differences between rules and standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1992).
132. See, e.g., MARCO BECHT & COLIN MAYER, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE
EUROPE 1, 18 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001) (finding that in 50% of non-financial listed
companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, a single blockholder controls more than 50% of
voting rights, whereas in 50% of Dutch, Spanish, and Swedish companies, a single blockholder controls
more than 43.5%, 34.5%, and 34.9% of votes, respectively); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The
Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 378–83 (2002) (noting
that only around 37% of Western European firms are widely held).
133. Pursuant to a guarantee of confidentiality, nonpublic information can be shared between
management and controlling shareholders or blockholders. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 16, at 20.
134. Because the private information may not be material according to the E.U. test at a relatively
early stage, trading on the basis of this information would not violate insider trading prohibitions.
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probability/magnitude test because the materiality threshold of highmagnitude future events would be crossed earlier.

V. CONCLUSION
The global adoption of the probability/magnitude test for determining
the materiality of future events would achieve a meaningful global policy
objective. Regardless of whether one is optimistic or pessimistic about the
future, predictions about potential developments in the lives of publicly
held corporations matter to investors. The ever-increasing desire of
investors to diversify their portfolios not only across industries but also
across countries, so as to reduce systemic risks, fuels a growing need to
guarantee the integrity of cross-border investment opportunities in
financial markets.
Adopting the U.S. probability/magnitude test as a global test for
assessing the materiality of predicted events would serve this policy
objective. Although this test, as compared to a bright-line rule, may be
somewhat more of a burden for corporations, it has the advantage of
promoting confidence in the integrity of stock markets and corporations
around the globe. The U.S. probability/magnitude test casts a wider net
on events of greater material consequence than does the E.U. bright-line
test. In this respect, the probability/magnitude test serves the integrity of
the stock markets better by guaranteeing that corporate insiders do not
profit opportunistically from nonpublic material information and that top
executives focus on maximizing corporate profits rather than on seeking
self-serving trading opportunities.
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